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INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST COOPERATION IN NAFTA:
THE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ASSISTANCE ACT
OF 1994
CHARLES S. STARK*

INTRODUCTION
The drafters of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
recognized that effective antitrust enforcement goes hand in hand with
the lowering of governmental barriers in achieving open and competitive
markets.' This is the premise behind NAFTA Chapter 15, "Competition
Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises." The first paragraph in Chapter
15 sets out a core commitment by each of the NAFTA parties to adopt
or maintain, and to enforce, laws to deal with anticompetitive business
conduct. The second proposition set out in the first article of the chapter
is that cooperation and coordination in enforcing antitrust laws is essential
among the NAFTA antitrust authorities.
Neither antitrust enforcement nor antitrust cooperation were new ideas
among the NAFTA partners. Both the United States and Canada have
antitrust histories that go back more than a century, although Canada's
modern antitrust history really dates back to the important 1986 amendments to its Competition Act. 2 Along with this common history, our
long common border, and extensive economic integration, the United
States and Canada have developed an extraordinary record of antitrust
cooperation. Aspects of this cooperation were an important inspiration
for the innovative and forward-looking legislation adopted in the United
States last year, the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
(IAEAA) of 1994.1
Mexico's antitrust regime is, of course, newer. The present state-ofthe-art antitrust law became effective in 1993, and we have had a deepening
relationship with our Mexican counterparts since then. 4 We hope and
5
expect that cooperation between Mexico's Federal Competition Commission
and its United States and Canadian counterparts will ripen into the kind

* Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
1. Article 1501(l) of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.Mex. (effective Jan. 1, 1994), 32 I.L.M. 605, 663 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Competition Act § 61, R.S.C. ch. C-34 (1985) as amended, (2d Supp. 1986).
3. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438, Nov. 2,
1994, 108 Stat. 4597 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (1994)).
4. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [Federal Law of Economic Competition-hereinafter
Mexican Competition Law], DiARio OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACII5N [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FEDERATION-hereinafter D.O.] (Dec. 24, 1992).
5. Article 23 of the Mexican Competition Law creates the Comisi6n Federal de Competencia
[hereinafter the Federal Competition Commission].
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of day-to-day cooperation that now exists between the United States and
Canada.
This note will describe the history and current state of antitrust cooperation among the NAFTA partners. The IAEAA will be described as
well as the potential within NAFTA and beyond to integrate efforts of
the United States and other foreign antitrust authorities to combat cartels
and anticompetitive practices in ways that have never before been possible.
ANTITRUST COOPERATION WITH MEXICO AND CANADA
The story of U.S.-Mexican antitrust cooperation is a briefer and more
recent story than that of our cooperation with Canada. Before agreeing
in NAFTA to adopt an antitrust law, the Mexican government drafted
an initial proposal recognizing that, independently of NAFTA, antitrust
would be an important component of its own economic reform policies.
It was in the course of those efforts, as the Mexican officials responsible
for developing the new law collected the views and experiences of antitrust
officials in the United States and elsewhere, that work was begun in
Mexico City.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has hosted lawyers
and economists from the Federal Competition Commission who have
come to Washington for several weeks to take advantage of the United
States' antitrust experience and to learn not to repeat our mistakes. The
Department of Justice has responded to requests from the Commission
to send experts to Mexico City to consult on issues of general application
and issues that had arisen in particular cases with which we had developed
expertise.
In addition to meeting in our respective capitals, we have met regularly
in the Organization for Economic Competition and Development (OECD)
Committee on Competition Law and Policy, where Mexican antitrust
officials have made important and welcome contributions, initially as
observers and now as full members. In fact, although there is as yet no
bilateral antitrust agreement in. place between the United States and
Mexico, there is an OECD recommendation on antitrust cooperation that
has contributed importantly to enforcement cooperation and conflict
management among OECD countries.6 This recommendation dates back
to 1967, and was revised and strengthened this year to emphasize the
importance to effective enforcement of coordination and information
sharing among antitrust authorities.
Mexico, Canada and the United States also take part in a working
group established by Article 1504 of the NAFTA to examine the relationship between trade and competition policies in the free trade area.
Its mandate is to develop a recommendation to the NAFTA Commission
on these issues by the end of 1998. The analysis and recommendations

6. Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries
on Competitive Practices Affecting International Trade, July 28, 1995, O.E.C.D. Doc. No. C(95)130
(Final).
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of the American Bar Association and its Canadian and Mexican counterparts have been of tremendous value to the working group.7
The United States and Canada have been dealing with one another on
antitrust matters for some time. In fact, both the United States' earliest
and its most recent antitrust agreements have been with Canada. The
first of these was the 1959 "Fulton-Rogers understanding," a publicly
acknowledged but unwritten agreement that each country would notify
the other of any antitrust enforcement action that might affect the other's
interest, and would be prepared to consult about it if requested. 8
U.S.-Canada antitrust cooperation got a huge boost in 1990 when the
U.S.-Canada Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) went into effect.9
MLATs are bilateral treaties, pursuant to which the United States and
a foreign country agree to assist one another in criminal law enforcement
matters. MLATs create a routine channel for obtaining a broad range
of legal assistance including taking testimony or statements from witnesses,
providing documents and other physical evidence in a form that would
be admissible at trial, and executing searches and seizures.
Both the United States and Canada treat hard-core cartels such as
price fixing, bid-rigging, market divisions and the like, as criminal offenses
under our respective antitrust laws. We very quickly seized on the new
MLAT's potential for antitrust enforcement, and have made good use
of it, in both directions, for the past few years.
Within the past two years, close cooperation between the United States
and Canada in criminal antitrust enforcement has led to prosecutions in
separate industries such as fax paper l° and disposable plastic dinnerware"
or "plasticware". Both the fax paper and plasticware cases involved pricefixing, a hard-core antitrust violation. Our cooperation in connection
with fax paper has resulted in prosecutions in both the United States
and Canada. Cooperation in plastic dinnerware led to prosecutions in
the United States. This process is not a one-way street, but has been

7. Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law on The Competition
Dimension of NAFTA (July 20, 1994).
8. See Can. House of Commons Debates, Vol. I at 617-619 (1959).
9. Treaty with Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.Can., S. TREATY Doc. No. 14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
10. U.S. v. Kanzaki Papers, Inc., Kazuhiko Watanabe, Mitsubishi Corp., & Mitsubishi International Corp., Crim. No. 94-10176NMG, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094, No. 4086 (D. Mass.
July 14, 1994); U.S. v. Elof Hansson Paper & Board, Crim. No. 95-10141JLT, 6 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 45,095, No. 4135 (D. Mass. May 9, 1995); U.S. v. Mitsubishi Paper Mills, Ltd., Crim.
No. 95-10296MLW, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,095, No. 4169 (D. Mass. Sept. 26, 1995); U.S.
v. New Oji Paper Co., Crim. No. 95-10297WGY, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 45,095, No. 4170
(D. Mass. Sept. 26, 1995); U.S. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., Jujo Paper Co., Nippon Paper Indus.
Co., Hirinori Ichida, & Jerry A. Wallace, Crim. No. 95-10388JLT, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
45,095, No. 4184 (D. Mass. Dec. 13, 1995).
11. U.S. v. Plastics, Inc. & James Nurmi, Crim. No. 94-00245, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45,094, No. 4071 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1994); U.S. v. Clement Izzi, Robert Westbrook, & Warren
White, Crim. No. CR94-00243, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 45,094, No. 4070 (E.D. Pa. June 9,
1994); U.S. v. Polar Plastics Mfg., Andrew Liebmann, & Basem Atallah, Crim. No. CR94-00246,
6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094, No. 4072 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1994); U.S. v. Comet Products,
Inc., & Russell Greer, Crim. No. CR94-00247, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094, No. 4073 (E.D.
Pa. June 9, 1994).
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one that benefits enforcement, and ultimately consumers, on both sides
of the border.
In the fax paper matter, the United States Antitrust Division and the
Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy have worked closely together
under the terms of the U.S.-Canada MLAT to uncover and break up
an international cartel in the $120 million a year thermal fax paper
market. Most of the customers victimized by this price fixing scheme are
small businesses and owners of home fax machines. This joint investigation
has resulted so far in United States' prosecutions of five Japanese corporations and one of their executives, U.S. subsidiaries of two Japanese
firms and one of their executives, the U.S. subsidiary of a British
corporation and one of its executives, and the U.S. subsidiary of a
to charge higher prices to U.S.
Swedish corporation, for conspiring
consumers of thermal fax nper.12 Defendants that have plead guilty in
the case so far have agreed to pay more than $10 million in fines in
the United States. Parallel prosecutions under Canadian antitrust laws
have resulted so far in criminal fines of 3.5 million Canadian dollars.
This joint investigation is still ongoing.
Coordination with Canadian officials was also essential to breaking up
a price-fixing conspiracy in the $100 million plasticware industry. 3 In
that investigation, search warrants were simultaneously executed by over
50 agents of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the FBI at target
offices in Montreal, Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. The result,
to date, has been guilty pleas from seven executives and three corporations.
The three corporations were fined in excess of $9 million, and each of
the seven United States and Canadian individual defendants received jail
sentences, with the United States ringleaders receiving 1-2 years in jail.
It is also worth noting here that two of the individuals who were fined
and received jail time in this matter, four months in each case, are
Canadian nationals who provided valuable cooperation and voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the United States courts. I
think it fair to say that this would have been an unlikely occurrence
only a few years ago.
Our Canadian colleagues announced the successful conclusion of another
joint U.S.- Canadian investigation, this time in the ductile pipe industry.
Following months of close cooperation between the U.S. Justice Department's Antitrust Division and our Canadian counterparts, we concluded that we did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute under the
U.S. antitrust laws. But the evidence did establish a violation of Canadian
antitrust law, and contributed to4 the successful prosecution and plea
agreement announced in Ottawa.'

12. Supra note 9.
13. Supra note 10.
14. See Government of Canada Press Release No. 7331, "Canada Pipe Co. Pleads Guilty and
Pays Record $2.5 M Fine for Conspiracy Offence Under the Competition Act," Ottawa (Sept. 27,
1995).
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These are not the only investigations in which we and the Canadian
antitrust authorities are cooperating or coordinating our efforts. There
are others, but because they have not yet resulted in public charges, I
cannot describe them in more detail. But at the start of this decade, the
idea of this kind of coordination and information sharing would have
been unprecedented and seemed unachievable. Today it is the norm.
Last month the United States and Canada signed a new antitrust
cooperation agreement." This agreement replaces the 1984 understanding,
which both countries have recognized had grown obsolete in its emphasis
on conflict avoidance, and its relative neglect of the enforcement cooperation that had become the main theme in our dealings with each
other on antitrust. 6 A measure of the closeness of the U.S.-Canada
antitrust relationship is the fact that negotiations on this new agreement
started in April, agreement had already been reached on most issues by
June, and the agreement was formally concluded by the beginning of
August. I can tell you from my own experience as a negotiator of our
other antitrust agreements that this reflected an extraordinary and unprecedented commonality of approach.
The new agreement is similar in many ways to the agreement signed
7
in 1991 between the United States and the European Community. It
provides that both parties will take the other's interests into account in
antitrust enforcement. The agreement provides that each party can ask
the other to enforce its antitrust laws against local conduct that adversely
affects the other's interests, something that has come to be referred to
as "positive comity." It calls for bi-yearly meetings between U.S. and
Canadian authorities. And of course, it provides for cooperation and
coordination in our enforcement efforts whenever there is a potential for
mutual assistance and reinforcement.
Our new agreement with Canada still does not take us where we
ultimately want to be. It does not take advantage of the full potential
of our new antitrust cooperation law although the Canadians have put
out a public proposal for counterpart legislation.
THE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1994
Antitrust has undergone the same "internationalization" in recent years
as has the business and economic environment generally. The importance
of international trade to the United States is beyond doubt. The tre-

15. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws,
13,503.
Aug. 3, 1995, U.S.-Canada, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
16. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws,
13,503A.
Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Canada, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
17. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, September
13,504.
23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
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mendous growth in transborder economic activity is reflected in our
enforcement numbers. Just over two years ago the number of investigations and cases pending in the Antitrust Division with significant international aspects was sixteen, already a high figure when compared to
prior years. When last counted, the number of investigations and cases
pending in the Antitrust Division had grown to over forty. This number
only includes the civil and criminal Sherman Act investigations. These
statistics do not include mergers, where it is more the rule than the
exception for companies whose mergers we are scrutinizing to have operations around the world.
. But the Antitrust Division, like our sister antitrust agencies around the
world, have worked under a limitation that has severely hampered our
ability to cooperate with one another. Even our new agreement with
Canada shares a limitation present in existing antitrust agreements. The
agreement did not change or override provisions in either party's law
designed to protect the confidentiality of information. Consequently, if
the U.S. Department of Justice and a foreign antitrust agency are investigating the same international cartel we cannot share the most important fruits of our respective investigations.'" These confidentiality
provisions in national laws serve legitimate purposes, but they had also
become an impediment to the kind of cross-border cooperation required
in the late twentieth century global economy. A further limitation was
the absence in these agreements of a fully satisfactory mechanism to deal
with the increasingly frequent need for foreign-located evidence in the
hands of firms or individuals.
The Antitrust Division was acutely aware by the early 1990s that
transnational conduct and cross-border transactions had become common
antitrust enforcement concerns and that the tools available to us and to
our foreign counterparts had not kept pace. The early international
antitrust cooperation arrangements, the OECD instruments and the first
generation of bilateral agreements, had once seemed advanced because
antitrust had become a subject of international discussions long before
other areas of economic regulation or economic crime. The Antitrust
Division saw that international cooperation in other areas had leap-frogged
the arrangements that prevailed in antitrust. Notably, securities regulators
and tax authorities had developed effective networks of bilateral agreements. These agreements allowed the kind of powerful enforcement cooperation achieved under our MLAT with Canada but that was not
possible under any of our other antitrust agreements.
The Antitrust Division believed that the time was ripe to move forward
in antitrust. The need was great and the attitudes of governments seemed
conducive to cooperation. It had become the norm rather than the
exception for countries to embrace competition principles expressed through

18. This information is typically obtained through the grand jury process in the United States
and through search and seizures or what are sometimes called "dawn raids" in many other
jurisdictions.
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antitrust laws as a central element of economic policy. Most countries
accepted that these laws should apply in appropriate circumstances to
foreign or transnational conduct as the realities of international business
made strictly territorial views of jurisdiction unrealistic. Antitrust authorities in two or more countries often found themselves examining the
same or related transactions and met each other with a will to cooperate
that was impeded by limits in existing laws and international arrangements.
This sense of need and readiness for new modes of cooperation was
reinforced by the pathbreaking joint settlement the Antitrust Division
and the European Community achieved in our parallel cases against
Microsoft last year) 9 There, the Department of Justice and the European
Commission shared investigative information (with Microsoft's permission)
and jointly negotiated remedies.20
The Antitrust Division was conscious that Canada, with whom we had
been enmeshed in intense jurisdictional disputes at the beginning of the
1980s, had become our closest enforcement partner. The Antitrust Division
was particularly struck that Australia, with whom we had also been at
loggerheads over jurisdiction just over a decade earlier, had recently
passed legislation to share confidential evidence in economic law matters
with foreign authorities. 2'
These considerations led last year to the introduction and enactment
of the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994.2 The
legislation was introduced at the initiative of the Department of Justice's
-Antitrust Division. It was supported by both political parties, drafted in
consultation with representatives of the business and legal communities
and passed without opposition in both houses of Congress in a remarkably
brief ten weeks from its introduction. Clearly the view that better tools
were needed for international antitrust enforcement cooperation was widely
held in the United States.
The IAEAA follows the basic outline of earlier legislation that authorized U.S. securities regulators to cooperate with their foreign counterparts. It allows the U.S. antitrust authorities to enter into agreements
with foreign antitrust authorities to exchange information with one another
whose disclosure would otherwise be prohibited by confidentiality laws,
and allows use of their investigative powers at the request of a foreign
authority23 to obtain evidence from private parties in their respective territories.
The basic concept of the bill, reciprocal cooperation, was never controversial but the IAEAA provisions reflect business concerns over the

19. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. Action No. 94-1564LO, 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096
(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995).
20. International Trustbusting-Exchanging Information With Foreign Antitrust Authorities: Hearing
on S.2297 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice).
21. Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act, Aust]. Acts P. (1992).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12 (1994).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 6202(b) (1994).
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risk of improper use or disclosure of confidential business information
that could be given to a foreign authority.2 Before the U.S. agencies
can provide confidential information they must be confident that the
foreign antitrust authority can and will afford protection to the information comparable to that afforded by the U.S. agencies.
The IAEAA also requires that the U.S. agencies determine in each
case that providing assistance is consistent with the interests of the United
States.2" Presumably, agreements reached under the IAEAA will afford
comparable discretion to the other party. By allowing this discretion, the
IAEAA deals with concerns that the United States or the other party to
an agreement might be required to give assistance in a case it viewed
as antithetical to its interests. Thus agreements under the bill will provide
a framework for cooperation that would not otherwise be possible, where
there is a mutual desire to cooperate. But the agreements will a!so provide
an escape door with a low threshold for instances in which a party
believes it is against its interests to do so.
There are exceptions to the kinds of information that can be provided
under the IAEAA. The principal exception is that information obtained
by the U.S. authorities as a result of premerger notification requirements
cannot be given to foreign authorities. 26 The IAEAA does not exclude
cooperation in merger investigations, however, it merely prevents disclosure of premerger filings and information obtained through "second
requests" in merger investigations. Nevertheless, at the request of a foreign
antitrust authority the U.S. agencies may address a request to the merging
companies on the foreign authority's behalf, and the companies may be
obliged to comply with the request.
The benefits of this kind of cooperation, whatever the nature of the
investigation are clear. Antitrust authorities in two or more countries
that are looking into the same conduct will be able to cooperate and
coordinate their investigations fully, sharing critical evidence without being
limited to what is publicly known. Evidence located in another country
can be obtained through cooperation with the authorities of that country,
eliminating disputes over unilateral methods of obtaining foreign-located
evidence. Finally, there will be fewer cases in which antitrust authorities
will be unable to deal with anticompetitive transnational conduct because
the necessary facts are beyond their reach.
At this point, no agreements under the new law are yet in place. The
Antitrust Division has started to visit antitrust authorities and other
relevant departments in a number of countries to explain what is new
possible and to encourage their interest. The Antitrust Division hopes
the first agreements will be negotiated and implemented soon. A particularly encouraging fact is that Canada is actively and publicly considering
amendments to its antitrust law that would parallel the IAEAA and pave
the way for even closer coordination of our enforcement efforts.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 6204(1) (1994).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 6211(2) (1994).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 6204 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
Cooperation between the United States and Canada in the enforcement
of our respective antitrust laws, particularly enforcement against cartels
which are criminal offenses in both countries, is more advanced than
cooperation between any other two countries. Antitrust cooperation with
Mexico, whose law and enforcement institutions are newer and less
developed, can be expected to expand significantly in the coming years.
Beyond the NAFTA countries, it is increasingly evident that more extensive
cooperation among the world's antitrust authorities will be necessary to
meet the challenges of today's global economy

